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Abstract
This Essay will report, analyze, and criticize the eighty-five page opinion of the Constitutional
Court. Notwithstanding any criticism, the judgment is certain to have an impact on the European
Union as it emerges from the Maastricht Treaty. The concluding section will assess that impact.
By way of introduction, the following section will give a survey of earlier opinions rendered by
the Constitutional Court on issues relating to European integration.
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HEDGING EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: THE
MAASTRICHT JUDGMENT OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
OF GERMANY*
Karl M. Meessen**
INTRODUCTION
It is at the federal level that a federation, once founded by a
compact of its composing states, decides upon the validity of federal acts of government. Unlike a federal state, the European
Union' - the new name of the functionally enlarged European
Communities ("Community" or "E.C.") - continues to depend
upon the view from below. The Member States of the European
Union have retained the power of constitutional review of legislative and administrative acts adopted by the Union. Such power
of review may be in violation of European law. Yet at the same
time, it may be mandated by Member State law. Litigation
brings the conflict to a head: does the last word on the validity
of European legislative or administrative acts lie with the Court
of Justice of the European Communities or with Member State
courts? In the latter case, the Unionwide validity of European
Union acts may be placed in jeopardy, and, in the former case,
Member States may be considered to have abandoned a core element of their sovereignty.
The jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court of
Germany (the "Constitutional Court" or the "Court") has shifted
back and forth between a more European and a more national
* For a German language version of the paper, see Karl M. Meessen, Maastricht
nach Karlsruhe, 47 NEUEJURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr 549 (1994).
** Dr. iur., Professor of Public Law, International Law, European Law and International Trade Law at the University of Augsburg, Augsburg, Germany; former President
of the University of Augsburg and Visiting Professor at the Universities of Chicago and
Paris II as well as at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland.
1. See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, art. A(3), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719,
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992) (amending Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd.5179-1I), 298
U.N.T.S. 3 (1958)) [hereinafter TEU].
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stance. Its latest pronouncement, the Maastricht judgment of
October 12, 1993,2 reserves the right of final review for German
courts. Consequently, despite confirming the constitutionality
of the Maastricht Treaty, the judgment qualifies for the latter
category of a nationally assertive position.
This Essay will report, analyze, and criticize the eighty-five
page opinion of the Constitutional Court. Notwithstanding any
criticism, the judgment is certain to have an impact on the European Union as it emerges from the Maastricht Treaty. The concluding section will assess that impact. By way of introduction,
the following section will give a survey of earlier opinions rendered by the Constitutional Court on issues relating to European
integration.
I. FLUCTUATING CASE LAW
In the first cases submitted to the Constitutional Court, constitutional complaints filed against E.C. regulations were dismissed on the ground that they were not directed against "German" acts of state as is required under the Statute on the Constitutional Court.3 The opinion also noted that the E.C. system of
judicial review should not be considered deficient merely because it was different from the German system.4
The Constitutional Court took a step backward seven years
later when it judged inadequate the newly developed protection
of fundamental rights by the Court of Justice of the European
Communities (the "Court of Justice").' In the Stauder case 6 of
1969, the Court ofJustice had begun stating fundamental rights
in the form of "general principles of Community law" and applying them as a standard of Community legislation." In the Nold
2. Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) [hereinafter BVerfG],
Judgment of Oct. 12, 1993 (Maastricht), 89 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (hereinafter BVerfGE] 155.
3. See Order of Oct. 18, 1967, 22 BVerfGE 293; see also Order of July 5, 1967, 22
BVerfGE 134.
4. Order of Oct. 18, 1967, 22 BVerfGE at 298.
5. Order of May 29, 1974 (Solange I), 37 BVerfGE 271.
6. Erich Stauder v. City of Ulm, Sozialamt, Case No. 29/69, [1969] E.C.R. 419,
[1970] 9 C.M.L.R. 112.
7. Id. at 425, [1970] 9 C.M.L.R. at 119; Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v.
Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fSir Getreide und Futtermittel, Case No. 11/70, [1970] E.C.R.
1125, 1134, [1972] 11 C.M.L.R. 255, 282.
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case 8 of 1974, the protection of fundamental rights was indirectly given a written law basis when the Court held that the European Human Rights Convention reflected general principles
of E.C. law.9 A fortnight after the Nold decision, the Constitutional Court of Germany decided to reserve for itself a right to
review Community legislation pursuant to the fundamental
rights of the German Constitution "as long as" the European
Communities had no "catalogue" of European fundamental
rights upon which to rely.1" That catalogue should be adopted
by the European Parliament and it should reflect the same standard of protection guaranteed by the German Constitution."
Five years later, the Constitutional Court started inching towards a revision of its 1974 pronouncement.1 2 It eventually overturned that decision by suspending any constitutional review of
Community legislation "as long as" the Court ofJustice sustained
the existing standard of protection of fundamental rights under
European law, which was considered to have meanwhile become
quite adequate. 3
The pro-European trend reached its high-water-mark when,
in 1987, the Constitutional Court overturned a decision by the
highest tax court of Germany for having "in an objectively arbitrary manner" failed to submit a case for another preliminary
ruling to the Court of Justice under Article 177 of the E.C.
Treaty.14 "Failure to submit" was diplomatic language to explain
that the Federal Tax Court had decided to ignore a preliminary
ruling by the Court of Justice, which in its view exceeded the
limits of judicial law-making by attributing directly binding effects to an E.C. directive on value-added tax. 15
The recent setback, ominously announced by scholarly papers authored by the judge-rapporteur in charge of Europe related cases, occurred on October 12, 1993.16 Several individual
8. J. Nold v. Commission, Case No. 4/73, [1974] E.C.R. 491, [1974] 14 C.M.L.R.
338.
9. Id. at 507, [1974] 14 C.M.L.R. at 354.
10. Order of May 29, 1974 (Solange I), supra note 5, at 271.
11. Id. at 285.
12. Order of July 25, 1979 (Vielleicht), 52 BVerfGE 187.
13. Order of Oct. 22, 1986 (Solange II), 73 BVerfGE 339.
14. Order of Apr. 8, 1987, 75 BVerfGE 223, 234.
15. Bundesfinanzhof, 20 EUROPARECHT 191, 193-96 (1985); Gerda Kloppenburg v.
FinanzamtLeer, Case No. 70/83, [1984] E.C.R. 1075, 1084, [1985] 42 C.M.L.R. 205,216.
16. Paul Kirchhof & Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Deutsches Verfassungsrecht und
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complaints had been filed against the federal statute ratifying
the Maastricht Treaty establishing the European Union, as an
amendment to the Constitution facilitating the ratification of
the treaty. Dismissing those complaints, most of them as inadmissable and one of them as unfounded, the Maastricht
Treaty was set to enter into force on November 1, 1993, which
was, ten months later than originally planned. Hence, the immediate effect of the judgment was positive. That effect, however, was offset by a number of constraints the Constitutional
Court imposed on future steps towards European integration as
well as on the operation of day-to-day European politics.
II. THE MAASTRICHT OPINION
Subject to some clarification, the Maastricht judgment
seems acceptable in so far as it grants individuals the right to
base constitutional complaints on a violation of the democratic
principle. The principle of democracy, developed to serve as a
standard of substantive law in the Maastricht proceedings and in
future cases, requires some qualifying supplementation. The
Constitutional Court's obiter dictum as to the right to review legislative and administrative acts of the European Union, however,
violates European law and is unwarranted under German constitutional law.
A. Democracy as an Individual Right
According to Article 93(1) no. 4a of the Basic Law
(Grundgesetz, i. e. the German Constitution), constitutional
complaints have to be based on at least one of the individual
rights enumerated in that provision. As one might expect, the
complaints invoked a great number of those rights. The Constitutional Court, however, considered only one of the complaints
to be admissible, and then, only to the extent that it was based
upon a violation of the right to vote in elections to the Federal
Diet (Bundestag)." 7 The reason was that the right to vote was
potentially affected by a transfer of competences by the German
Europdisches Gemeinschaftsrecht,

EUROPARECHT

11

(Beiheft 1/1991); Paul Kirchhof,

EuropiiischeIntegration und nationales Vefassungsrecht, 23

ZEITSCHRIFr FOR ARBEITSRECHT

459 (1992); Paul Kirchhof, EuropiiischeEinigung und der Verfassungsstaat der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in J. Isensee (Hrsg.), EUROPA ALS POLTISCHE IDEE UND ALS RECHTLICHE
FORM 63 (1993).
17. Judgment of Oct. 12, 1993, supra note 2, at 171-79.
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parliament to another institution.1 8
Indeed, it requires an individual right to advance an individual complaint. Indirectly, however, constitutional rules of a nonindividual, objective character may become relevant if such rules
affect the legality of a limitation of an individual right. In an
early case, the Constitutional Court held that the constitutional
guarantee of personal freedom, which may be limited by a legislative act, is impaired whenever the legislative act is invalid for
some other reason, such as lack of competence. 9 Taking up
that approach in the Maastricht case, the Constitutional Court
now considers it possible that the right to vote becomes meaningless if parliament, though composed by perfectly democratic
elections, transfers its powers by way of an international agree0

mentY

The starting point for the argument is well taken. But
where does it lead to? Is any transfer of powers from parliament
to another body, be it a supranational organization or an administrative agency inside Germany, vulnerable to attack by individual complainants purporting to protect the integrity of their
right to vote in federal elections? The answer is no, and that
answer is not contradicted by anything the Constitutional Court
said in the Maastricht opinion. On the contrary, the Constitutional Court pointed out that the right to vote has to be "emptied" ("entleert"), rather than merely diminished, before an in21
dividual voter has standing to file a constitutional complaint.
In that respect, German observers will remember the so-called
Enabling Law of 1933 by which the then Imperial Diet (Reichstag) transferred its powers to the Imperial Government headed
by Adolf Hitler.2 2 It is comforting to know that, by reference to
the Maastricht judgment, a single voter would have the right to
challenge such an act of collective abdication.

18. Id. at 171-72.
19. Cf. Judgment ofJan. 16, 1957 (Elfes), 6 BVerfGE 32, 41; Order ofJune 6, 1989
(Reiten im Walde), 80 BVerGE 137, 152-54.
20. Judgment of Oct. 12, 1993, supra note 2, at 172.
21. Id.
22. Gesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich (Law to Remove the Right
of the People and the Reich), Mar. 24, 1933, 1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT [hereinafter
RGBI] 1 141 (Ger).
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B. The Level of Democratic Legitimacy
After pronouncing itself in favor of the admissability of one
of the individual complaints for the aforementioned reasons, the
Constitutional Court examined and eventually dismissed the
complaint on its merits. 23 The issue of questioning the constitutionality of the Maastricht Treaty has thereby been laid to rest.
The rule developed by the Constitutional Court and applied in
the Maastricht complaint, however, can henceforth be invoked
as a constitutional standard whenever someone decides to submit for constitutional review a future German statute ratifying an
amendment of the Maastricht Treaty, whose revision is, under its
own terms, envisaged for 1996.24
The starting point for the Constitutional Court's reasoning
is set forth in a constitutional clause recently inserted into the
German Constitution ("Grundgesetz" or "Basic Law") to cover
the acceptance of the Maastricht Treaty. Article 23 of the Basic
Law, whose original version has become obsolete as a result of
German reunification, subjects a treaty establishing a European
Union, as well as any other agreement providing for a major
amendment of such a treaty, to the regular requirements of procedural and substantive law regarding amendments to the constitution: the statute approving such an agreement has to be
adopted by a two-thirds-majority in both houses of parliament,
and the principles of Articles 1 and 20 of the Basic Law have to
be observed. The new rule reflects earlier case law on the more
generally worded Article 24 of the Basic Law, which simply states
that "the Federation may transfer powers to international institutions by way of legislative acts." Establishing the European
Union indeed means altering the German Constitution, subjecting it only to those fundamental principles of human dignity,
due process and democratic decision-making that may not be
affected by any amendment to the Constitution.
The Constitutional Court's discussion of admissability resulted in identifying the principle of democracy as the principal
standard for review. Clearly, constitutional amendments, in particular if designed to set up the European Union, imply changing the process of democratic decision-making. The "level of
democratic legitimacy," however, as the Constitutional Court put
23. Judgment of Oct. 12, 1993, supra note 2, at 181.
24. TEU, supra note 1, art. N(2), O.J. C224/1, at 99, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 739.
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Obviously, democratic legitimacy
it, has to be maintained.
would be seriously undermined if the bulk of decision-making
power were transferred from Member State parliaments to the
Council of the European Union where Member State governments engage in a supranational bargaining process quite remote from control by national parliaments. The Court touched
upon this problem but did not make it the center-piece of its
argument.26 Instead, it devoted its attention to the possibility of
a subsequent erosion of powers on the part of national parliaments if the Maastricht Treaty authorized the European Union
27
to assume additional powers not specifically transferred to it.
Accordingly, the Court did not draw up a balance sheet of
competences transferred versus competences retained by the
Federal Diet. Rather, it proceeded directly to examining those
provisions of the Maastricht Treaty that could be considered susceptible to a later expansion of competences. The Court reviewed a number of provisions of that kind, but either (i) found
them to be lacking binding character, such as Article F(3) of the
Treaty under which the European Union is entitled to "provide
itself with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry
through its policies,"28 or (ii) gave the rules a narrow interpretation so as to make changes subject to formal amendments of the
Treaty, which would in turn be subject to parliamentary approval
and constitutional review. An example of the latter type of argument was the discussion of a possible need to supplement the
third stage of the monetary union by a corresponding transfer of
additional economic policy competences.2 9 Furthermore, the
Court emphatically declared that any further enlargement of
competences under the implied-powers doctrine or under the
effet-utile principle of interpretation would be contrary to European Law.3 °
The controling principle is based on precedent in German
constitutional law. In a case relating to a purely domestic context, the parliament was deemed to be precluded from divesting
itself of essential elements of its decision-making power in favor
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Judgment of Oct. 12, 1993, supra note 2, at 182.
Id. at 184.
Id. at 187-88.
Id. at 194-95.
Id. at 206-07.
Id. at 210.
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of indirectly legitimized decision-makers.3 1 The Court was close
to declaring unconstitutional a statute by which the state governments, when called upon to examine applications for the construction of nuclear plants, were merely instructed to observe
the "standards of scientific and technical knowledge."3 2 The
doctrine of obliging Parliament to retain its essential decisionmaking power was transferred to an international context in the
Eurocontrol case. 33 Eurocontrol, a governmental organization
dealing with safety in certain segments of airspace, was considered free to proceed from "raising" fees to "collecting" them
since the latter activity, though not specifically mentioned in the
convention setting up Eurocontrol, was found to be covered by
its "program of integration."3 4 With respect to NATO, the program of integration was found in two further cases to include
parliamentary approval of an authority extended to the United
States government to decide upon the location of nuclear and
chemical weapons.3 ' The Court added that, in an international
context, a lesser degree of precision was required lest the Federal Republic lose its capability of foreign policy action. 6
There is no reason to criticize the Constitutional Court for
scrutinizing the conclusiveness of the enabling provisions contained in the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union, and yet,
there is a difference between Eurocontrol and NATO, on the
one hand, and the European Union, on the other. Both
Eurocontrol and NATO are purely governmental organizations.
Decisions are taken without any direct democratic control. By
contrast, the European Union and the European Communities,
as its predecessor institutions, have been endowed since 1952
with a parliamentary body originally called the Assembly. 7
Since 1979, its members are directly elected. The competences
of the European Parliament in law-making, budgeting and exercising political control have continuously been expanded, most
31. Order of Aug. 8, 1978 (Kalkar), 49 BVerfGE 89, 126.
32. Gesetz fiber die friedliche Verwendung der Kernenergie und den Schutz
gegen ihre Gefahren (Atomgesetz) § 21, at 316 (Dec. 23, 1959).
33. Order ofJune 23, 1981 (Eurocontrol), 58 BVerfGE 1, 37.
34. Id. at 3740.
35. Judgment of Dec. 18, 1984 (Pershing), 68 BVerfGE 1; Order of Oct. 29, 1987
(Chemiewaffen), 77 BVerfGE 170.
36. Judgment of Dec. 18, 1984, supra note 35, at 92, 99; Order of Oct. 29, 1987,
supra note 35, at 77, 170, 230-34.
37. See TEU, supra note 1, O.J. C 224/1, at 98, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 737.
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recently by the Maastricht Treaty itself.3 8 To be sure, those competences still lag behind those of the Federal Diet or other national parliaments. Nevertheless it would be a mistake to consider the transfer of competences to the European Union an unmitigated loss of democratic control as in the case of
Eurocontrol and NATO.
Such compensatory considerations have a firm foothold in
Article 79 of the German Constitution. That provision does not
safeguard any particular institutional structure of democratic decision-making. It safeguards the principle of democracy or, as
the Court put it, the level of democratic legitimacy. The level of
democratic legitimacy, however, may be maintained by any democratically elected parliament. Thus, democratic legitimacy may
be derived partly from the Federal Diet and partly from the European Parliament. Emphasis may shift from the one to the
other even though, as should be added, it is hard to conceive,
given the very size and diversity of Europe, that the European
Parliament could ever replace national parliaments altogether.3 9
With respect to fundamental rights, the Constitutional
Court acknowledged compensating for a loss of nationally
granted rights by a commensurate gain of rights granted on a
European level. 40 No valid reason exists to reach a different conclusion in the case of democratic legitimacy. Any transfer of
constitutional autonomy to the European Union might deprive
Germany of a core element of sovereign statehood.4 1 Such loss,
unless justifiable under the principle of openness towards European integration, may be contrary to the guarantee of the sovereign statehood of Germany, which may, or may not, be another
principle barred from constitutional amendment considered by
Article 79(3) of the Basic Law.42 The principle of democracy,
however, would only be violated if a partial loss of influence on
the part of the Federal Diet were not compensated for by a cor38. See, e.g., Eberhard

Grabitz, Institutionelle Anpassung der EG, in WErER-

ENTWICKLUNG DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFrEN UND DER MARKTIRTSCHAFT, REFERATE DES XXV. FIW-SyMposIONS 105, 111-19, 124-31 (1992).

39. Cf Fritz W. Scharpf, EuropiischesDemokratiedefizit und deutscher Fderalismus,3
STAATSWISSENSCMAFTEN UND STAATSPRAXiS 293, 296-99 (1992).
40. Order of Oct. 22, 1986 (Solange II), supra note 13, at 376.
41. Cf PETER M. HUBER, MAASTRICHT - EIN STAATSSTREICH? 29-31 (1993).
42. Cf id. (supporting supposed guarantee of sovereign statehood); Bundesregierung (F.R.G.) EtrrwuRu EINES GESETZES ZUR ANDERUNG DES GRUNDGESETZES, Oct. 2,

1992, BUNDESTAGSDRUCKSACHE 12/3338, at 7.
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responding gain of influence by the directly elected European
Parliament. The European Parliament looks poised to make
sure that such compensatory democratic legitimacy will be accorded whenever the Member States decide to move another
step ahead in the process of European integration.
C. Exceeding the Program of Integration
Reviewing acts of the European Union was not the subject
of the Maastricht complaint. All the same, the Constitutional
Court decided to let its position be known: future legislative,
administrative or judicial acts adopted by the European Union
that exceed the "program of integration" will not have binding
force in Germany.4" If ever the European Union chose, for example, to take legal measures on the basis of Article F(3) of the
Maastricht Treaty, German authorities will be obliged to withhold their "allegiency" ("Gefolgschaft"), as the Constitutional
Court put it in somewhat Wagnerian language." And if ever
legal acts of the European Union "broke out" of the competences transferred to it, it would be for the Constitutional Court
to provide final review in Germany.4" Furthermore, the Constitutional Court, explicitly overruling its long-time jurisprudence,
expanded the protection of fundamental rights from German
acts of state to cover European legal acts as well. 4"
To be sure, not every petty measure adopted by the European Union without authority under the Maastricht Treaty
would now be considered to constitute an excess of the program
of integration. The focus of the Constitutional Court rather was
on aspects of judicial law-making characteristic of the jurisprudence of the Court ofjustice.4" At that point, the Constitutional
Court even seemed to regret having in the past been so generous
as to acknowledge the potential direct effect of E.C. directives.
Thus, it can no longer be taken for granted that it would reach
the same conclusion if it had to review the value-added tax directive today.48 With regard to the recent Francovichjudgment by
43. Judgment of Oct. 12, 1993, supra note 2, at 188.
44. Id. at 195.
45. Id. at 188.
46. Id. at 175.
47. Id. at 210.
48. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing overreaching by Federal
Tax Court in failing to submit case to Court ofJustice for preliminary ruling).
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the Court of the European Communities, 49 the Maastricht opinion makes one wonder whether German courts would now be
expected to deviate from that judgment and refuse to award
damages in a case where there is a failure to implement an E.C.
directive.
On the whole, actions for constitutional review in Germany
of measures already found legal by the Court of Justice of the
European Communities will rarely be successful. Nevertheless,
attorneys may try and present cases for review. They could even
be rewarded by providing their clients with some bargaining
power resulting from the uncertainties inherent in any litigation.
The administrative implementation of decisions adopted by organs of the European Union might thereby be delayed.
The Court's obiter dictum is not without significance. Is it
justified? The answer will first be given under European law and
then under German constitutional law with the latter, of course,
exclusively determining the perspective of the Constitutional
Court.
Under Article 164 of the E.C. Treaty, it is for the Court of
Justice to "ensure observance of law and justice in the interpretation and application of this Treaty."50 There is no exception to
that principle. If there were one, the authority of the Court of
Justice would be seriously undermined. It would in particular be
undermined if, from the point of European law, Member State
courts were free to second-guess and contradict positions
adopted by the Court ofJustice. More importantly, the principle
for Unionwide validity of European legal acts would be abandoned. In a most sensitive case involving an Italian statute on
the nationalization of utilities, the Court of Justice explained the
need for Unionwide validity and proclaimed the supremacy of
European law." Since that decision, the Court ofJustice has not
moved an inch from that position.52
In an effort to justify its approach, the Constitutional Court,
49. Francovich v. The Republic of Italy, Joined Cases Nos. C-6/90 and C-9/90,
[1991] E.C.R. 1-5357, 1-5415, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 66, 114.
50. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 1973
Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-Il), 298 U.N.T.S. 3, 73 (1958) [hereinafter E.C. Treaty].
51. Costa v. ENEL, Case No. 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585, 593-94, [1964] 3 C.M.L.R.
425.
52. See, e.g., Court of Justice, Opinion 1/91, O.J. C 110/1 (1992), [1991] E.C.R. 16079, 1-6102.
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quoting the Zwartveld ruling of the Court ofJustice, 51 made mention of an obligation of Community Organs to engage in "loyal
cooperation with member states."5 4 In addition, the Constitutional Court quoted with approval a statement made by the head
of the Legal Service during the Maastricht proceedings that
Community Organs would always seriously consider any Member
State concerns that certain community action might infringe
upon its constitutional law, and that the Community Organs
would endeavor to find a way to proceed in conformity with the
constitutional law of that Member State.55 In the Zwartveld opinion, the Court of Justice, however, merely found the Commission obliged to comply with a request for judicial assistance on
the part of a Member State court implementing Community
law.56 The statement by the head of the Legal Service gives accurate expression to what follows from common sense, namely an
intention to avoid unnecessary conflicts. 5 7 It is well known that
many matters within the competence of the European Union remain unregulated and that European law, even where it offers a
rule, does not necessarily exclude additional rules of Member
State law as long as they do not disregard the purpose of the rule
of European law."8 Neither authority, if a statement made by an
official at the oral hearing may be called such, suggests that
Member States are free to declare acts of the European Union
ultra vires after the Court ofJustice has found them to be in conformity with European law.
The Constitutional Court's assertion that it reserves for itself
final control of legal acts of the European Union that exceed the
"program of integration" contradicts European law. Does German constitutional law mandate such an outright challenge to
European law? The controlling rule again is found in Article
79(3) of the Basic Law, which precludes from constitutional
amendment not only the principle of democracy but also the
principle of due process. Like the principle of democracy, due
53. Judgment of Oct. 12, 1993, supra note 2, at 202.
54. Zwartveld, Case No. C-2/88 Imm, [1990] E.C.R. 1-3365, 1-3373, [1990] 3
C.M.L.R. 457, 463.
55. Judgment of Oct. 12, 1993, supra note 2, at 202.
56. Zwartveld, [1990] E.C.R., at 1-3373, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 458.
57. Judgment of Oct. 12, 1993, supra note 2, at 202.
58. Cf Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, Case No. 14/68, [1969] E.C.R. 1, 13-16,
[1969] 8 C.M.L.R. 100, 105-117.
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process is not guaranteed with respect to any particular system of
judicial review, including review by the Constitutional Court.
The Constitutional Court's early pronouncement on the lack of
reviewability of legal acts of the Community so held. 5 The same
reasoning underlies the more relaxed position the Constitutional Court adopted in 1986 regarding the observance of the
fundamental rights of the German Constitution.60 In the Maastricht opinion, the Constitutional Court specifically endorsed
that opinion, which is referred to in Germany as the Solange II
("As-Long-As no. 2") decision.6" One may wonder why the Constitutional Court did not follow that approach and hence failed
to examine whether transferring final review to the Court of Justice, though necessarily reducing the right of review by Member
State courts, maintained the level of due process guaranteed in
Germany.6 2

If the Constitutional Court had, as it should have, assessed
the comparative level of due process, it could hardly have
avoided the conclusion that the Court of Justice lived up to the
standard of protection under German law. The Constitutional
Court itself made that point with respect to the protection of
fundamental rights.6" It did so despite the fact that the standard
of review of fundamental rights is necessarily different, whereas,
in reviewing acts ultra vires, it is only Community law that has to
be applied, either by the Court of Justice, or a German court
double-checking the Court of Justice for an "excess of the program of integration." The record of the Court ofJustice may not
be flawless. In the Francovich case, for instance, the Court ofJustice may have advanced too far and even have done so in an
unfortunate desire to lend judicial support to the implementation of directives.64 If the Francovich case was wrongly decided, it
59. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing Constitutional Court's
early rejection of complaints not directed against German acts of state).
60. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing Solange II).
61. Judgment of Oct. 12, 1993, supra note 2, at 174-75.
62. Order of Oct. 22, 1986 (Solange II), supra note 13, at 376.
63. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (discussing observance by Constitutional Court of fundamental rights of German Constitution).
64. See Francovich v. The Republic of Italy, Joined Cases Nos. C-6/90 and C-9/90,
[1991] E.C.R. 1-5357,1-5415, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 66; see, e.g., Fritz Ossenbfihl, Dergemeinschaftsrechtliche Staatshafiungsanspruch,107 DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT 993 (1992)
(presenting critical reviews of Francovich judgment); Joachim Karl, Die Schadensersatzpflicht der MitgliedstaatenbeiVerletzungen des Gemeinschaftsrechts, 38 RECIIT DER INTERNATIONALEN WiRTscRAFrT 440 (1992) (presenting critical reviews of Francovichjudgment); see,
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is for reviewers to criticize the Court of Justice and it is for the
Court of Justice to correct itself, as it did, when it moved from
Hag I in 1974 to Hag II in 1990, regarding the conformity of
territorially limited trademarks with the principle of free movement of goods.6" The proven ability of correcting itself may even
deserve more respect than an attitude of having been right all
along.
On matters of competence, the record of the Court of Justice is perfectly acceptable. 66 The Constitutional Court at least
should have given its reasons for its differing view. Instead of
doing so, the Constitutional Court referred to two earlier decisions." One of those decisions, the ruling in Eurocontrol, relates
to an international institution that does not provide for any system of judicial review whatsoever.6" Member States could not,
and did not, transfer a right of final judicial review to that organization. Hence, there was no need to examine the legality of any
transfer ofjudicial powers under Article 79 of the German Constitution. The other decision cited by the Constitutional Court
was related to the European Economic Community, but it was
rendered to implement and enforce a judgment of the Court of
Justice, which by no means intimated contradicting the Court of
Justice or reserving a right of final control to German courts.6 9
The German Constitution does not prohibit the transfer of
final control to the Court ofJustice. There is not even a need to
invoke the somewhat elusive principle of "open statehood" set
forth both in the preamble of the Constitution and in the new
e.g., John Temple Lang, New LegalEffects Resultingfrom the Failureof States to Fulfill Obligations Under European Community Law: The Francovich Judgment, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1
(1992-1993) (presenting more positive assessment of Francovich judgment); Fernand
Schockweiler, Die Haflung der EG-Mitgliedstaaten gegeniiber dem einzelnen bei Verletzung des
Gemeinschaflsrechts,.28 EuRoPAREcHT 107 (1993) (presenting more positive assessment of
Francovichjudgment).
65. Cf, e.g., S.A. CNL-SUCAL NVv. Hag GF AG, Case No. C,-10/89, [1990] E.C.R. I3711, at 1-3757-60, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571, 595-97; Van Zuylen Freres v. Hag A.G., Case
No. 192/73, [1974] E.C.R. 731, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 127.
66. See Hans Kutscher, Ober den Gerichtshof der Europiiischen Gemeinschafl, 16
EUROPARECHT 392, 400, 406-10 (1981); see also Statement made by Judge Zuleeg in Carl
Otto Lenz, Der Vertragvon Maastrichtnach dem Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts,46 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr 3038 (1993).
67. Judgment of Oct. 12, 1993, supra note 2, at 188.
68. Order ofJune 23, 1981, supra note 33.

69. Order ofJuly 25, 1979 (Vielleicht), supra note 12.
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version of Article 23.o
III. CONFIRMING THE HALT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
The Constitutional Court allowed the Maastricht Treaty to
enter into force. The ratio decidendi, however, defined a standard
of review that, due to the incomplete statement of the rule,
seems to set a higher threshold for future statutes ratifying treaty
amendments than actually warranted. Unlike those grounds
forming part of the ratio decidendi, the obiter dictum regarding the
review of ultra vires acts has no binding force under Section
31 (1) of the Statute on the Constitutional Court. 7 1 Nevertheless,
that obiter dictum will, despite the criticism raised here, exert persuasive force on German governmental agencies, courts and especially politicians who traditionally enjoy backing up their policy statements by references to Constitutional Court opinions.
As to the effects on the European Commission, the head of its
Legal Service was probably right when he mentioned the deference usually extended to the constitutional law of member states
and their constitutional courts.72 Instead of facing the prospect
of an action brought under Article 170 for an infringment of the
treaty, which may now be enforced by imposing penalty payments,7 3 Germany has a fair chance of seeing its constitutional
concerns preempted by additional caution in European Union
decision-making. These slow-down effects are compounded by a
series of statements made by the Constitutional Court that seem
destined to either down-play the present level of integration or
to provide ammunition for attacks against further steps of integration.
As an example of the former, the term, "Staatenverbund,"
introduced to characterize the European Union should be considered. That new combination of two existing words is placed
squarely into the midst of a number of traditional terms, such as
Staatenbund (confederation), Staatenverbindung (international
Putting
organization) and Bundesstaat (federal state).
70. KLAus VOGEL, DIE VERFASSUNGSENTSCHEIDUNG DES GRUNDGESETZES FOR EINE INTERNATIONALE ZUSAMMENARBEIT, EIN DISKUSSIONSBEITRAG ZU FINER FRAGE DER STAATSTHEORIE SOWIE DES GELTENDEN DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTS 42 (1964).
71. Bundesgesetzblatt 2230 (19851)
72. Cf supra note 55 and accompanying text (quoting statement made during
Maastricht proceedings).

73. Cf E.C. Treaty, supra note 50, art. 170, 298 U.N.T.S. at 75.
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"Staaten-" in the beginning suggests an emphasis on the constituent elements rather than the common organization. Combining it with "-verbund" instead of "-bund," has the charm of novelty but is burdened with connotations of former usage that are
less than inspiring, such as networks of public utilities or of suburban train services.
The term Staatenverbund apparently has to be credited to
Paul Kirchhof, the judge rapporteur of the Maastricht proceedings, who declared his preference for that term as opposed to
the term "supranational organization," which, in his view, implies an erosion of the statehood of its members. 74 In the Maastricht opinion, the new term is, on the one hand, used only interchangeably with the traditional designation "supranational organization, 7 5 which is firmly rooted in other European
languages as well. 76 On the other hand, the Constitutional
Court lent support to Kirchhof's approach of scaling back the
European Union by including, in a somewhat technical context,
the astonishing statement that, should "(monetary) stability of
the Community" fail, there was always the possibility of "leaving
77
the Community."
Examples of arguments against future steps of integration
are the emphasis the Court placed upon the absence of a European nation (Staatsvolk) 78 and its listing of requirements of homogeneity for a people to constitute a nation, oddly enough by
reference to a paper of Hermann Heller published in 1928. 79
In fact, the development of European integration after the
Second World War has outgrown the old dichotomy of "state or
non-state," and Herman Heller, further down in his 1928 paper,
proved not far off the mark musing over the possibility of best
74. Paul

Kirchhof et al.,

Europiiische Einigung und der Verfassungsstaat der

Bundesrepublik Deutschland, inJOSEF ISENSEE (ed.),

EUROPA ALS POLITISCHE IDEE UND ALS

RECHTLICHE FORM 63, 64, 93 (1993).

75. Cf Judgment of Oct. 12, 1993, supra note 2, at 184.
76. See, e.g., Paul Reuter, COMMUNAUTt EUROPtENNE DU

CIARBON ET DE L'ACIER

140 (1953); Riccardo Monaco, Le comunitd sopranazionalinell'ordinamentointernazionale,8
COMUNITA INTERNAZIONALE 441 (1953); Peter Hay, FEDERALISM AND SUPRANATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

(1966); Joseph Weiler, The Community System: the Dual Characterof Suprana-

tionalism, 1 Y.B. EUR. L. 267 (1981).
77. Judgment of Oct. 12, 1993, supra note 2, at 204.

78. Id. at 188.
79. Id. at 186; Hermann Heller, PolitischeDemokratieund Soziale Homogenitdt (1928),
reprinted in H. HELLER, 2 GESAmMELTE SCHRIFTEN 421 (1971).
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preserving the nation by a "European federal state."' ° The potential for a supranational organization with a remarkable degree of socio-psychological coherence has been amply demonstrated during the last four decades. It was confirmed by the
introduction, in the Maastricht Treaty, of a novel status called
"citizenship of the Union." l In 1953, Robert Schuman, who was
one of the architects of postwar Europe, had this definition of
the notion of supranationality to offer:
Supranationality is placed in the middle between, on the one
hand, international individualism respecting the integrity of
national sovereignty and knowing only of such limitations of
sovereignty that are of an occasional, contractual and revocable nature and, on the other hand, the federalism of states
that are subordinated to a superstate endowed with territorial
sovereignty... The notion of supranationality "covers legally
binding reality;" the idea will prove fertile. As opposed8 2 to
confederationist concepts it has the advantage of clarity.
Today, there is little to add to those words that, in the final
analysis, were left unchallenged by the Constitutional Court
when it found that the question presented was not whether the
Basic Law permitted or precluded German membership in a European state. It is a question that may indeed never arise in the
process of European integration.
The thrust of the Maastricht opinion and of the multifaceted statements contained therein make a forceful plea for a
halt in the process of European integration. That halt, however,
may have already occured before the judgment was rendered: as
a result of the Treaty itself and of political events accompanying
its ratification.
Treaties establishing supranational organizations, like constitutions, only deal with those long-term problems of political
organizations that were perceived by their founders. The U.S.
Constitution establishes and, at the same time, limits the powers
of the Union. The authors of the FederalistPapers endeavored to
explain to the hesitant people of the State of New York how well
the rights of their home state would be protected under the fed80. Heller, supra note 79, at 433. I owe this reference to a comment made by
Judge Zuleg at a conference on February 18, 1994, in Innsbruck, Austria.
81. E.C. Treaty, supra note 50, art. 8, 298 U.N.T.S. at 17-18.
82. Robert Schuman, Preface, in Reuter, supra note 76, at 7 (translated from
French by author).
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eral constitution."3 Before Maastricht, the European Communities pledged to strive for an ever closer union. Apparently, the
organizational structure of the European Communities appeared too weak and the remaining powers of the Member
States were considered too strong to suggest any risk of "overintegration."
The activity and, to some extent, the activism of the European Commission headed by President Jacques Delors have
changed the situation. Fear has spread that the process of integration could become self-perpetuating and could no longer be
stopped. Hence, a countervailing principle was incorporated
into the text of the Maastricht Treaty: the principle of subsidiarity.8 4 It calls upon the European Union to exercise competences that have exclusively been transferred to it "only if and in
so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of5 the proposed action, be better
8
achieved by the Community."
In Germany, the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by the
Federal Parliament has to satisfy requirements of subsidiarity set
forth in Article 72(2) of the German Constitution. As a standard
for constitutional review, that provision has proven quite ineffective. German commentators therefore tend to doubt whether
the subsidiarity clause in the E.C. Treaty could ever serve as an
effective instrument of judicial control."6 There are procedural
devices, however, to implement subsidiarity.8 7 One of them is to
adjust law-making procedures so as to warn Member State legislators of forthcoming projects of European Union legislation.
The new text of Article 23(3) and (4) of the Basic Law obliges
83. ALEXANDER HAMILTON ET AL.,
eryman's Library 1948) (1787-88).

THE FEDERALIST OR, THE NEW CONSTITUTION

(Ev-

84. See generally E.C. Treaty, supra note 50, 298 U.N.T.S. at 3 (incorporating princi-

ple of subsidiarity).
85. E.C. Treaty, supra note 50, art. 3b, 298 U.N.T.S. at 16.
86. Von Dieter Grimm, Subsidiaritdt ist nur ein Wort, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE
ZEITUNG, no. 217, Sept. 17, 1992, at 38; Wernhard M6schel, Zum Subsidiaritatsprinzipim
Vertrag von Maastricht, 47 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRiFr 3025 (1993); see also
Nicholas Emiliou, Subsidiarity: An Effective BarrierAgainst "the Enterprisesof Ambition"?, 17

EUR. L. REv. 383 (1992) (presenting detailed analysis of E.C. Treaty as instrument of
judicial control).
87. Commission of the European Communities, The Principle of Subsidiarity,
Communication to the Council and the European Parliament, Oct. 27, 1992, SEC (92)
1990 final.
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the German government to give the Federal Diet and also the
second chamber, the Federal Council (Bundesrat), early occasion to make their views known regarding pending acts of European legislation. 8
In addition, the subsidiarity clause may prompt a reconsideration of judicial law-making under the effet utile principle.89
Effet utile is no longer exclusively defined by the objective of an
ever closer union. Hence, the principle of dynamic interpretation90 has now been neutralized to some extent by the more
static notion of subsidiarity.91 On that count, the Constitutional
Court may not have been wrong after all, even though it derived
its restrictive view not from the principle of subsidiarity but
rather from a supposedly new approach under the Maastricht
Treaty of distinguishing between exercising competences prop92
erly transferred and expanding them by way of amendment.
The close votes on the two Danish referendums and on the
French referendum, the near success of Conservative "Eurosceptics" in toppling the British government and the partly learned,
partly populist debate in Germany on substituting the ECU for
the Deutschmark are ample proof of depletion of pro-integrationist sentiment in a number of Member States. Furthermore,
the issue of enlargement of the European Union to the North
and to the East can no longer be withheld from the political
agenda. This is therefore an unlikely moment for further steps
of integration, either by way of a legal instrument taking stock of
what has been reached so far, or by way of the revision of the
Maastricht Treaty envisaged under its Article N(2) for 1996.
CONCLUSION
All in all, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany
seems to have pulled the emergency brake at a moment when
88. TEU, supra note 1, O.J. C 224/1.

89. See, e.g.,

ANNA BREDIMAS, METHODS OF INTERPRETATION AND COMMUNITY" LAW 77-

89 (1978) (discussing principle of effet utile); cf, e.g., Van Duyn v. Home Office, Case
No. 41/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1337,1348, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 1,9. The German translation of
the Dutch original opinion, unlike the English translation, adds the French term "effet
utile" in brackets behind the German equivalent for "useful effect."
90. See, e.g., Bleckmann, Teleologie und dynamische Auslegung des Europtiischen Gemeinschaftsrechts, 14 EUROPAREcHT 239, 255-56 (1979).
91. Cf Ulrich Everling, Reflections on the Structure of the European Union, 29 COMMON
MKT. L. REv. 1053, 1070-71 (1992).
92. Judgment of Oct. 12, 1993, supra note 2, at 209-10.
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the integrationist train had already come to a halt. The Constitutional Court's pronouncement, therefore, adequately reflects
today's public opinion, nailing it down, however, for an indefinite period of time. Public opinion is known for its lack of steadiness. Thus, politics may change and call for further substantial
steps towards European integration at a time when the Constitutional Court's pronouncement will still stand.
Notwithstanding the temporary halt of European integration, European politics can move ahead. A period of consolidation does not signal the beginning of disintegration. The socalled bicycle theory - a momentary standstill resulting in a fall
does not apply. On the contrary, exploiting the new opportunities offered by the Maastricht Treaty may bring about a convergence not only of economies and currencies but of the peoples
of Europe as well.

